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Abstract
To foster innovation and growth should basic research be publicly
or privately funded? This paper studies the impact of the gradual
shift in the U.S. patent system towards the patentability and commer-
cialization of the basic R&D undertaken by universities. We see this
movement as making universities becoming responsive to "market"
forces. Prior to 1980, universities undertook research using an exoge-
nous stock of researchers that were motivated by "curiosity." After
1980, universities patent their research and behave as private rms.
This move, in a context of two-stage inventions (basic and applied re-
search) has an a priori ambiguous e¤ect on innovation and welfare. We
build a Schumpeterian model and match it to the data to assess this
important turning point. Keywords: R&D and Growth, Sequential
Innovation, Basic Research, Patent Laws. JEL Classication: O31,
O34, O41.
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1 Introduction
Over the last 30 years, U.S. Court decisions switched from the doctrine
limiting the patentability of early-stage scientic ndings - lacking in current
commercial value - to the conception that also fundamental basic scientic
discoveries - with no current tradeable application - fall in the general ap-
plicability of the patent system.
The year 1980 marked an important turning point in US patentability
requirements, as summarized by the following events:
1. the United States Supreme Courts decision on the Diamonds v. Chakrabarty
case ruled that microorganism produced by genetic engineering could
be patented;
2. the Bayh-Dole Act, which facilitated universities in patenting innova-
tions.
After the second world war, universities and public laboratories had al-
ways been the main performers of basic R&D in the United States and in
Europe. Though an important reason for the relatively low private contri-
bution to basic R&D is often found in the high degree of uncertainty that
this activity involves in terms of future commercial application and success,
the legal permission to appropriate the fruits of years of investigations makes
a big di¤erence, and marks an important change from the pre-1980 to the
post-1980 US innovation system. Hence the 1980s jurisprudential and ju-
ridical reforms opened the way to a ow of private funds into the academia
in search of promising research projects, as well as facilitated professors in
patenting their own research without incurring in legal obstacles linked to
their direct or indirect involvement in the public system.
Jensen and Thursby (2001) studied the more recent licensing practices
of 62 US universities. They found that "Over 75 percent of the inventions
licensed were no more than a proof of concept (48 percent with no proto-
type available) or lab scale prototype (29 percent) at the time of license!".
Moreover, most of the inventions licensed were in such an embryonic state
of development, that it was di¢ cult to estimate their commercial potential
and the inventors cooperation was required to get a successful commercial
development.
In a more general denition of research tools, the US National Institute
of Health (1998) is embracing the full range of tools that scientists use in
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the laboratory, and includes "cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, reagents,
animal models, growth factors, combinatorial chemistry libraries, drugs and
drug targets, clones and cloning tools... methods, laboratory equipment and
machines, databases and computer software". Nearly all research tools be-
came patentable in the US, thanks to the juridical innovations that took
place in the last 30 years.
The agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs), article 27, encourages countries to extend patentability to"any in-
ventions, whether products or processes, in all elds of technology, provided
that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial
application", and a footnote follows specifying: "For the purposes of this Ar-
ticle, the terms "inventive step" and "capable of industrial application" may
be deemed by a Member to be synonymous with the terms "non-obvious" and
"useful" respectively." Hence a "useful" research tool should be patentable.
Though to ".. make all research activities free of patent infringement would
make all research tool patents worthless, and would be contrary to TRIPs",
(Thouret-Lemaitre1, 2006), the adoption of TRIPs by several countries is
still controversial, as strong research exemptions to patent infringement are
in place in countries such as Japan2, China3, Belgium4, Germany5, India6,
1Elisabeth Thouret-Lemaitre, Vice President, Head of Patent Operations, Sano-
Synthelabo, Paris, WIPO Presentation October 11, 2006.
2Japan: art 69 (1): " the e¤ects of the patent right shall not extend to the working of
the patent right for the purposes of experiment or research."
3Article 62 of the Patent Law of the Peoples Republic of China: "None of the following
shall be deemed an infringement of a patent right:...5. Use of the patent in question solely
for the purposes of scientic research and experimentation".
4Where since 2005 the new Article 28(1)(b) of the Belgian Patent Act states that a
patent holders claims do not extend to acts that are committed on and/or with the
subject of the patented invention for scientic purposes.
5The German Constitutional Court (2000) stated that patent holders must "accept
such limitations on their rights in view of the development of the state of the art and
the public interest". Thus the patent claims become controversial when the commercial
interest of the unauthorized use of a patented innovation is not clear.
6Section 47 of the Patent Act states that The patented product or process "may be
used, by a person for the purpose merely of experiment or research."
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Brazil7, Mexico8, and Korea9. Even if the European Directive on Biotech-
nology of 1998 aimed at extending patentability to many research tools, it
is still being implemented in contradictory ways, leading to a situation in
the middle between the pre- and post-1980 US regime. Statutory research
exemptions and compulsory licensing render patent claims much weaker.
We believe that an economic analysis of the US turning point may give
good insight to start a scientic debate rich of relevant policy implications
at least for Europe. This paper, by taking the R&D sequentiality into the
Schumpeterian paradigm, investigates the relation between the cumulative
uncertainty involved in the two-stages innovation process and the ine¢ ciency
in the public research system. Our main theoretical contribution is a the-
ory of endogenous public ine¢ ciency in basic research. Regarding private
research, we share the decomposition of each innovation in two stages of re-
search and development with the oligopolistic patent race literature pioneered
by Reinganum (1985), Grossman and Shapiro (1986) and (1987), and, more
recently, Denicolò (2000). We contribute with several new insights, by adding
free entry, endogenous multisector industrial dynamics and general equilib-
rium determination of all variables. Our general equilibrium analysis allows a
consistent numerical calibration of our theory to the true US data. The main
alternative macroeconomic predecessor is Aghion and Howitt (1996), which
identied basic research with horizontal innovation10. Since in the real world
all sectors need basic research not just once, we adopt the complementary
view that basic research pervades all sectors, which forces us to substantially
modify the standard multisector framework with vertical innovation11. We
7Article 43 of the Brazilian Industrial Property Law: "The provisions of the preceding
Articles shall not apply:...II. to acts carried out for experimental purposes by unauthorized
third parties if related to study or to scientic and technological research."
8Article 22 of the Industrial Property Law: "The right conferred by a patent shall
not have any e¤ect against: (I) a third party who, in the private or academic sphere and
for non-commercial purposes, engages in scientic or technological research activities for
purely experimental, testing or teaching purposes, and to that end manifactures or uses a
product or a process identical to the one patented".
9Section 96(1) of the Patent Law states: "The e¤ects of the patent right shall not
extend to the following: (i) working of the patented invention for the purpose of research
or experiment. . . ".
10Gersbach, Sorger, and Amon (2009) extends this framework, with basic research po-
tentially opening more new sectors than applied research manages to complete. Bramoulle
and Saint-Pauls (2010) incorporates a realistic reputation reward system based on cita-
tions.
11Interestingly, unlike Aghion and Howitt (1996), Leiva-Beltran (2007) constructs a
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will assume that basic research can be "curiosity driven", but that it could
also be motivated by its potentially socially useful applications.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the mod-
ications in Schumpeterian theory needed to analyse the two-stage innova-
tion process stylizing the innovative mechanism in the presence of research
tools. It focusses on the most original aspects of the model, leaving the most
standard parts to the Appendix 1, in order to facilitate readability. Sec-
tion 3 applies this new framework to a stylized pre-1980 US scenario: basic
research ndings are conceived in public institutions and put into the pub-
lic domain, triggering patent races by freely entering perfectly competitive
private R&D rms aiming at inventing a better quality product. Section 4
models a stylized post-1980 US scenario, where basic R&D achievements are
patented and, afterwards, developed into tradable applications within a com-
pletely privatized economy. Free entry patent races only occur in the basic
research, whereas as soon as a research tool is discovered it will be developed
by its patent holder. Section 5 matches the model to the US data prevailing
at the time of the jurisprudence and legislative change. We estimate the
relevant technological parameter and we undertake numerical simulations in
order to assess if the reform could have enhanced innovation. In Section 6,
we test the robustness of our ndings in an alternative model of privatized
basic research, which explicitly includes the debated existence of a "research
exemption", which might give birth to reach-through patenting agreements
after an infringement suit. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Overview
Consider an economy with a continuum of di¤erentiated nal good sectors
with corresponding di¤erentiated research and development (R&D) sectors,
along the lines of Grossman and Helpman (1991a and b). In each sector there
is a instantaneous price competition, which implies - under the usual constant
returns to scale assumption - that at every date there will be a monopolist,
that coincides with the owner of the patent on the highest quality product
model in which cost reducing technological progress opens the way to potential applications
to specic market. We can interpret the former as basic research and the latter as applied
research.
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in its industry. Product improvements occur in each consumption good in-
dustry, and, within each industry, rms are distinguished by the quality of
the nal good they produce. When the state-of-the-art quality product in
an industry ! 2 [0; 1] is jt(!), R&D rms compete in order to learn how to
produce the jt(!)+1st quality product. We extend the standard quality lad-
ders model by introducing a two-stage innovation path, so rst a researcher
catches a glimpse of innovation through the jt(!) + 12th inventive half-idea,
and then other researchers engage in a patent race to implement it in the
jt(!)+ 1st quality product12. The best real world interpretation of our "half
ideas" are the research tools. So, in each industry, the R&D activity is a
two stage process by which, rst a new idea is invented upstream - a rst
"half-idea" - and then it is used to nd the way to introduce a higher qual-
ity product: in the words of Grossman and Shapiro (1987, p.373), the "two
stages may be thought of as research and development, respectively."
As in Grossman and Helpman (1991a and b), time is continuous with an
unbounded horizon and there is a continuum of innitely-lived households
with identical intertemporally additive preferences. Heterogeneous labour,
skilled and unskilled, is the only factor of production. Both labour mar-
kets are assumed perfectly competitive. In the nal good sectors ! 2 [0; 1]
monopolistically competitive patent holders of the cutting edge quality good
produce di¤erentiated consumption goods by combining skilled and unskilled
labour, whereas research rms employ only skilled labour. To facilitate the
exposition, the most standard analytical details of the model can be found
in the Appendix 1.
2.2 The Mechanics of R&D, and Preliminary Results
In our economy the whole set of industries f! 2 [0; 1]g gets partitioned
into two subsets of industries: at each date t, there are industries ! 2 A0
with (temporarily) no research tool and, therefore, with one quality leader
(the nal product patent holder), no applied research and a mass of basic
researchers, and the industries ! 2 A1 = [0; 1]n A0, with one research tool
and, therefore, one quality leader and a mass of applied researchers directly
12Of course, half ideas could be as di¢ cult to get as are Nobel prizes: see, for example,
the Cohen-Boyer patents on the basic method and plasmids for gene cloning (granted in
1990).
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challenging the incumbent monopolist. Researchers engage in useful13 basic
R&D only in ! 2 A0 industries, while R&D rms engage in applied R&D
activity aimed at a nal product innovation only in A1 industries. When a
quality improvement occurs in an A1 industry, the innovator becomes the
new quality leader and the industry switches from A1 to A0. Similarly, when
a discovery arises in an industry ! 2 A0 this industry switches to A1. Figure
1 illustrates the ow of industries from a condition to the other:
Figure 1 Representation of the economy by ows of industries
Notice that in our multisector two-stage environment with perpetual inno-
vation basic R&D alternates with applied R&D in all sectors of the economy.
The two sets A0 and A1 change over time, even if the economy will eventually
tend to a steady state. At any instant we can measure the mass of industries
without any half-idea as m(A0) 2 [0; 1], and the mass of industries with an
uncompleted half-idea as m(A1) = 1  m(A0). Clearly, in the steady state
these measures will be constant, as the ows in and out will o¤set each other.
However, the endogenous nature of the steady state equilibrium distribution
of sectors allows us to study the e¤ects of di¤erent institutional scenarios -
patentability regimes, public sector ine¢ ciency - on technological dynamics
and aggregate innovation. Let index i = B;A denote basic or applied re-
search. ni(!; t),indicates the mass of skilled labor employed in basic, and,
respectively, applied research in sector ! 2 [0; 1] at date t. A researchers
13In one of the three economies stylized in this paper, namely the Public Basic Research
scenario, some basic research is undertaken also in A1 industries, but it produces no
innovation.
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Poisson process probability of succeeding in inventing a half-idea, or com-
pleting one (i.e. introducing the product innovation), is decreasing in the
aggregate sectorial R&D labor, ni  0. In particular, we specify the per-
unit time Poisson probability intensity to succeed for a basic and an applied
research labour unit respectively as
B(!; t)  0nB(!; t) a, ! 2 A0 (1)
A(!; t)  1nA(!; t) a , ! 2 A1 (2)
where k > 0, k = 0; 1, are R&D productivity parameters14 and constant
0 < a < 1 is an intra-sectorial congestion parameter, capturing15 the risk of
R&D duplications, knowledge theft and other diseconomies of fragmentation
in the R&D. Each Poisson process - with arrival rates described by (1)-
(2) - governing the assumed two-stage innovative process is supposed to be
independent across researchers and across industries. Hence the total amount
of probability per unit time of inventing a basic half idea in a sector ! 2 A0
at date t is nB(!; t)B(!; t) and the total amount of probability per unit time
of completing a basic research tool in a sector ! 2 A1 is nA(!; t)A(!; t).
Moreover, in all our scenarios, symmetric equilibria exist, allowing us to
simplify notation: nB(!; t)  nB(t) and nA(!; t)  nA(t).
2.2.1 Manufacturing
So far we have assumed an exogenously given aggregate amount of skilled
labour, L, employable in the manufacturing and in the R&D sectors; and an
exogenously given aggregate amount of unskilled labour,M , only employable
in manufacturing. Adopting the unskilled wage as the numeraire, we will
endogenously determine the skill premium, as summarized by the skilled
labour (relative) wage ws.
14Eq.s (1)-(2) are build on the assumption of a stationary population. With increasing
population, it is easy to recast our model, as done in Appendix 1, in terms of Dinopoulos
and Segerstroms (1999) PEG framework, which captures the di¢ culty of improving a
good in a way that renders a larger population happier. This eliminates the strong scale
e¤ect (Jones 2003) that plagued the early generation endogenous growth models, without
leading to "semi-endogenous" growth (Jones 1995, Segerstrom 1998), as consistent with
recent empirical evidence (e.g. Madsen, 2008). Despite its semplicity, this assumption is
equivalent to eliminating the strong scale e¤ect by means of an R&D "dilution e¤ect" over
an increasing range of varieties, as proved by Peretto (1998), Young (1998), Dinopoulos
and Thompson (1998) and (1999), and Howitt (1999).
15As in Jones and Williams(1998 and 2000) specication of the R&D technology.
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In all our equilibria, the per-capita mass of skilled labour employed in
manufacturing sector ! 2 [0; 1] at time t, labeled x(!; t), will be constant
across sectors and equal to x(!; t) = x(t). In fact, in the Appendix 1 we
prove that the manufacturing employment of the skilled labour obeys the
following decreasing function of the relative skilled wage ws:
x(!; t) =
1
ws(t)


1  

M  x(t),
where 0 <  < 1 is the skilled labour elasticity of output. Appendix
2 also show that at any date the prot ows are constant and equal to
 = (   1) 1
1 M , where  > 1 is the size of each product quality jump.
Since the total mass of sectors in the economy is normalized to 1, x(t) also
denotes the aggregate employment of skilled in manufacturing. Hence, these
always hold: x(t)ws(t) = Y (t) andM =Mwu(t) = (1 )Y (t), where Y (t)
is aggregate nal good production.
In light of the previous discussion, and dropping time indexes for simplic-
ity16, we can express the skilled labor market equilibrium as:
L =
1
ws


1  

M +m(A0)nB +m(A1)nA. (3)
Eq. (3) states that, at each date, the aggregate supply of skilled labor, L,
nds employment in the manufacturing rms of all [0; 1] sectors, x, and in
the R&D laboratories of the A0 sectors, nB, and of the A1 sectors, nA.
3 The Public Basic Research Economy
In this section we assume unpatentable basic scientic results, in order to
depict a pre-1980 US normative environment. In our model, public R&D is
allocated regardless of prot opportunities: since researchers get paid regard-
less of the protability of their discoveries, their activity is "curiosity driven",
and their rewards are not aligned to downstream needs. Hence their e¤orts
might, from a social viewpoint, be wrongly targeted. To stylize the partially
"un-focussed" research behavior of the public researchers, we assume that
16Of course time dependence is implicit, as employment variables, wage, and the mass
of sectors in which a half idea is present, respectively absent, keep changing over time,
except in the steady state.
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public researchers are totally indi¤erent to sectorial protability: when in a
sector ! that lacked a half-idea, i.e. belonged to A0, a research tool appears,
i.e. it becomes A1, the public R&D workers keep carrying out basic research
in that sector. Given our technological assumptions, this labour is redun-
dant from the economic view point because research tools cannot usefully
accumulate.
We will assume from here on that the public researchers are allocated
across di¤erent industries according to a uniform distribution.
We also make the assumption that the government exogenously sets the
fraction, LG 2 [0; L], of population of skilled workers to be allocated to the
heterogenous research activities conducted by universities and other scientic
institutions and funds it by lump sum taxes on consumers. The assumption
of lump sum taxation guarantees that government R&D expenditure does
not imply additional distortions on private decisions.
Given the mass of sectors normalized to 1, LG is also equal the per sector
amount of R&D. Therefore, each basic research labour unit has a probability
per unit of time of making a discovery equal to O  0 L aG . Therefore the
probability that in any sector ! 2 A0 a useful half idea appears is LGB 
L1 aG 0, whereas the probability that an existing half idea generates a new
marketable product is nAA = n1 aA 1.
Let us dene v0L the value of a monopolistic rm producing the top quality
product in a sector ! 2 A0, and v1L the value of a monopolistic rm producing
the top quality product in any sector ! 2 A1. These two types of quality
leaders - competing instantaneously a la Bertrand - both earn the same prot
ow, , but the rst type has a longer expected life, before being replaced
by the new quality leader, i.e. by the patent holder of the next version of
the kind of product it is currently producing. In sectors that are currently
of type A0 no applied R&D rms enters because there is no half idea to
develop: they shall wait until public researchers invent one, causing that
sector to switch into A1. Instead, in an A1 sector, applied R&D rms hire
skilled workers in order to complete the freely available half idea. Since
there is free entry into applied research, the R&D rms expected prots
are dissipated due to our assumption of perfectly e¢ cient nancial market
that completely diversify the portfolios of risk averse savers, and transferred
to the skilled workers. From a welfare perspective, entry into applied R&D
could be excessive, thereby generating distortions.
We dene r as the relevant real interest rate - the following equations will
hold at any date:
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ws = 1n
 a
A v
0
L (4a)
rv0L =    L1 aG 0
 
v0L   v1L

+
dv0L
dt
(4b)
rv1L =    n1 aA 1v1L +
dv1L
dt
. (4c)
Eq. (4a) is the free entry condition in downstream research in any sector
! 2 A1, equalizing the unit cost of R&D (the skilled wage) to the expected
marginal gain - the per unit time probability ow 1n aA of inventing the
next version of the nal product multiplied by the value of its patent, v0L.
Eq. (4b) states that perfectly e¢ cient nancial markets lead v0L to the unique
value such that the risk free interest income attainable by selling the stock
market value of a leader in an A0 industry, rv0L, equals the ow of prot 
minus the expected capital loss from being challenged by a half-idea on a
better product in the case a follower appears, L1 aG 0 (v
0
L   v1L), plus gradual
appreciation in the case of such event not occurring, dv
0
L
dt
. In a steady state
dv0L
dt
= 0.
Eq. (4c) equals the risk free income per unit time deriving from the
liquidation of the stock market value of a leader in an A1 industry, rv1L, and
the relative ow of prot  minus the expected capital loss, n1 aA 1v
1
L, due to
the downstream applied researcher rmsR&D, plus the gradual appreciation
if replacement does not occur, dv
1
L
dt
. In a steady state dv
1
L
dt
= 0.
All jump processes occurring at the industry level are independent across
industries, and the law of large number transforms ow probabilities into
deterministic ows. Hence, after aggregating over the set of sectors, the
dynamics of the mass of industries is described by the following rst order
ordinary di¤erential equation:
dm(A0)
dt
= (1 m(A0))n1 aA 1  m(A0)L1 aG 0. (5)
From the skilled labor market clearing condition:
x+ LG + (1 m(A0))nA = L, (6)
and the denition of x, we obtain the equilibrium mass of per-sector chal-
lengers:
nA =
L  1
ws
 

1 

M   LG
(1 m(A0)) . (7)
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Hence the dynamics of this economy is completely characterized by the
di¤erential equation system (4a)-(4c) and (5), with cross equation restriction
(7).
3.1 Balanced Growth Path
In a balanced growth path equilibrium all variables are constant ex-
cept the average quality of consumer goods17, and therefore the instanta-
neous percapita utility index, which grows at a constant rate18 ln()gPUBBL
proportional to the aggregate innovation rate gPUBBL = m(A0)L1 aG 0 =
(1 m(A0))1 (nA)1 a. Based on the previous characterization, we can
state:
Denition 1. A balanced growth path equilibrium of the Public Basic Re-
search economy is a vector [m(A0); nA; v0L v
1
L; ws; x; gPUBBL] 2 R7+, satisfying
m(A0) 2 [0; 1] and the following equations:
ws = 1n
 a
A v
0
L (8a)
rv0L = (   1) 11 M   L1 aG 0
 
v0L   v1L

(8b)
rv1L = (   1) 11 M   n1 aA 1v1L (8c)
x =
1
ws


1  

M (8d)
(1 m(A0))n1 aA 1 = m(A0)L1 aG 0 (8e)
x+ LG + (1 m(A0))nA = L (8f)
gPUBBL = 1 (1 m(A0))n1 aA . (8g)
Given the high non-linearity of system (8a)-(8g), we performed numerical
simulations in Matlab19. In all simulations a unique economically meaningful
17Since we are following Grossman and Helpmans (1991b) framework, it is the geometric
average D (t) = exp
hR 1
0
ln

j

t (!)djt (!)t (!)

d!
i
that matters. Appendix 1 claries these
aspects in detail.
18This is a usual property of quality ladder models (see e.g. Grossman and Helpman,
1991a and b). Find more on this in the welfare calculations in Appendix 1.
19The Matlab and Dynare les used to simulate the model are available from the authors
upon request.
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steady state equilibrium exists. Moreover, analysing the eigenvalues of the
Jacobian matrix of the fully dynamic (out of steady state) system shows that
the steady state equilibrium is saddle point stable. Therefore the equilibrium
is determinate.
Since in principle there could have multiple steady states, the empirical
calibrations and policy conclusions we will obtain in the later sections are
credible only if we can rst prove analytically the uniqueness of the steady
state. In fact, it turns out that this steady state equilibrium is unique, as
proved in the following20:
Lemma 1. In the Public Basic Research economy there can exist no more
than one balanced growth path equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
4 The Privatized Basic Research Economy
In this section, stylizing a post-1980 US scenario, we assume that once
a research tool is invented in an A0 sector, it gets protected by a patent
with innite legal life. The presence of enforced intellectual property rights
on the research tools permits the existence of a market for basic research
ndings. This implies that, unlike the public researchers of the previous
sections scenario, now the basic researchers target their activity only in the
A0 sectors.
Let vA, denote the present expected value of being a research tool patent
holder running a downstream applied R&D rm, operating in an A1 industry
and aiming at becoming a new quality leader. Such a rm - similarly to
Grossman and Shapiros (1986) monopolist - will optimally choose to hire
an amount nA of skilled research labour in order to maximize the di¤erence
between its expected gains from completing its own half idea - probability
of inventing, (nA)
1 a 1, times the net gain from inventing the nal product,
(v0L vA) - and the implied labour cost wsnA. From its rst order conditions,
we easily obtain the optimal applied R&D employment in an A1 sector:
nA =

(1  a)1(v0L   vA)
ws
 1
a
. (9)
20We are indebted to a Referee for this important analytical point.
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Unlike the previous section, now only the research tool patent holder can
undertake applied R&D in its industry, whereas free entry is relegated to the
basic research stage, where researchers vie for inventing the half idea that will
render the winner the only owner of a research tool patent worth vA. Hence
their freely entering and exiting mass will dissipate any excess earning, by
equalizing wage to the probability ow 0n aB times the value of a patent
on a half idea21, vA. Therefore excessive entry into basic research can cause
welfare losses.
Costless arbitraging between risk free loans and rms equities implies
that at each instant the following arbitrage equations must hold in equilib-
rium:
ws = 0n
 a
B vA (10a)
rvA = (n

A)
1 a 1(v0L   vA)  wsnA +
dvA
dt
(10b)
rv0L =    (nB)1 a 0
 
v0L   v1L

+
dv0L
dt
(10c)
rv1L =    (nA)1 a 1v1L +
dv1L
dt
(10d)
The rst equation, (10a), is the free entry condition in the upstream
basic research sector. The second equation equalizes the risk free income
deriving from the liquidation of the expected present value of the research
tool patent in an A1 industry, rvA, and the expected increase in value from
becoming a quality leader (i.e. completing the product innovation process),
(nA)
1 a 1(v0L   vA), minus the relative R&D cost, wsnA, plus the gradual
appreciation in the case of R&D success not arriving, dvA
dt
.
The third and forth equations are as in the previous section.
Plugging ws = 0n aB vA into the expression of the skilled labour wage
ratio (eq. 39, in the Appendix 1) and using percapita notation, we obtain:
x =
1
ws


1  

M = min

naB
0vA
; 1


1  

M . (11)
21Unlike Grossman and Shapiro (1987), the research tool patent holder has no incentive
to license, because in our framework scale diseconomies are assumed at the industry level
but not at the rm level.
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We have implicitly assumed that ws  1, because skilled workers always
have the option to work as unskilled workers. Therefore the skilled labor
employment in the manufacturing sector is inversely related to the market
value of patented research tools.
The skilled labor market clearing condition states:
x+m(A0)nB + (1 m(A0))nA = L (12)
Hence, since wages are pinned down by the optimal rm size and by the
zero prot conditions in the perfectly competitive basic R&D labor markets,
the unique equilibrium per-sector mass of entrant basic R&D rms consistent
with skilled labor market clearing (12) is determined by solving equation (12)
for nB:
nB =
L  x  (1 m(A0))nA
m(A0)
. (13)
To complete our analysis, let us look more closely at the inter-industry dy-
namics depicted by Figure 1. In the set of basic research industries a given
number of perfectly competitive (freely entered) upstream researchers, nB,
have a ow probability of becoming applied researchers, while in the set of
the applied R&D industries each of the nA per-industry applied researchers
has a ow probability to succeed. By the law of large numbers, the industrial
dynamics of this economy is described by the following rst order ordinary
di¤erential equation:
dm(A0)
dt
= (1 m(A0))1 (nA)1 a  m(A0) (nB)1 a 0. (14)
System (10b)-(10d) and eq. (14) - jointly with cross equation restric-
tions (11) and (13) - form a system of four rst order ordinary di¤erential
equations, whose solution describes the dynamics of this economy for any ad-
missible initial value of the unknown functions of time v0L, v
1
L,vA, and m(A0).
In a steady state, dv
1
L
dt
=
dv0L
dt
= dvA
dt
= dm(A0)
dt
= 0.
Remark. The important di¤erence from the unpatentable research tools
case, is that here: 1. There is - potentially excessive - endogenous entry
into basic research; 2. Congestion in applied research is internalized by the
basic patent holder. Therefore both the growth and the welfare comparisons
between the two regimes are not obvious and the outcome could depend on
the parameter values.
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4.1 Balanced Growth Path
In the balanced growth path equilibrium all variables are constant ex-
cept the average quality of consumer goods, and therefore the instanta-
neous percapita utility index, which grows at a constant rate ln()gPRIV
proportional to the aggregate innovation rate gPRIV = m(A0) (nB)
1 a 0 =
(1 m(A0))1 (nA)1 a. Based on the previous characterization, we can
state:
Denition 2. A balanced growth path equilibrium of the Privatized Basic
Research economy is a vector [m(A0); nB; nA; vA; v
0
L v
1
L; ws; x; gPRIV ] 2 R9+
satisfying m(A0) 2 [0; 1] and the following equations:
ws = 0n
 a
B vA (15a)
rvA = (n

A)
1 a 1(v0L   vA)  wsnA (15b)
nA =

(1  a)1(v0L   vA)
ws
 1
a
(15c)
rv0L =    (nB)1 a 0
 
v0L   v1L

(15d)
rv1L =    (nA)1 a 1v1L (15e)
(1 m(A0))1 (nA)1 a = m(A0) (nB)1 a 0 (15f)
L = x+m(A0)nB + (1 m(A0))nA (15g)
x =
1
ws


1  

M (15h)
gPRIV = m(A0) (nB)
1 a 0. (15i)
Given the analytical complexity of such system we resorted to numerical
analysis. It is worthwhile mentioning also in this case, that in all numerical
simulations of the fully dynamical system we have run, the steady state is
saddle point stable for any set of parameter values we have tried.
Since, in principle, our numerical simulations could converge to just one
of possibly many di¤erent steady states, the empirical calibrations and policy
conclusions we could obtain would not be credible unless we can rst prove
analytically the uniqueness of the steady state in the model we are using.
This is achieved by the following:
Lemma 2. In the Privatized Basic Research economy there can exist no
more than one balanced growth path equilibrium.
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Proof. See Appendix 2.
5 Quantitative Analysis
In general, simulating our models22 suggests that an economy in which
public basic research is conducted in a non-prot oriented manner can induce
less or more innovations and/or welfare than an economy in which basic
R&D is privately carried out. The privatized economy outgrows the public
basic research economy when the applied R&D productivity parameter, 1,
becomes very low: in such cases the equilibrium innovative performance of
the private economy with patentable research tools becomes better than the
equilibrium growth performance of the economy with a public R&D sector.
In fact, if 1 is very small or 0 is high, the ow out of A1 will be scarce,
whereas the ow out of A0 will be intense. Therefore in the steady state
m(A0) will be small, thereby exalting the wasteful nature of the public R&D
activity uniformly diluted over [0; 1]   A0: in this case the social cost of a
public R&D blind to the social needs signalled by the invisible hand would
overwhelm the social costs of the restricted entry into the applied R&D sector
induced by the patentability of research tools.
While the discussion so far highlights the growth perspective, the aggre-
gate consumer utility - welfare - is also a¤ected negatively by the potentially
excessive entry associated with patent races. Since in either regime there is
free entry into one of the two types of research activities, this may lead to
excessive entry into basic research in the private regime, and excessive entry
into development in the public regime. While the lack of commercial focus in
basic research can make publicly funded research worse, excessive entry into
basic research in the private regime can potentially counter this handicap.
Hence, it is not possible a priori to rank the two regimes.
In the next sections we will estimate the unknown parameters and use
others taken from the literature, in order to evaluate the alternative patenting
regimes. We will undertake our calibrations under the simplifying assumption
that the US economy was in an unpatentable research tools balanced growth
path from 1963 to 1980. This will deliver the parameter values with which to
simulate the alternative scenarios at the last year23 of the public basic R&D
22The codes we have used are available upon request.
23Qualitative results would not change if we had chosen another year, or included an
average of four years before 1979.
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regime (1979). We will not use data from 1980, because we cannot assume
that changes from one to the other regime are instantaneous: particularly in
the case of basic research, innovation takes many years and its e¤ects should
accrue over time.
5.1 Calibration
In this section we calibrate our model to a balanced growth path using
U.S. data from 1963 to 1980, obtaining the values of these parameters as well
as the endogenous variables in the unpatentable research tools case, which
we believe prevailed during that period. Our exercise will obtain an esti-
mation of the di¢ culty of R&D, summarized inversely by the basic/applied
productivity parameters, 0 and 1. Consistently with our theoretical model,
we use only skilled and unskilled labour as inputs and numbers of qualied
innovations as R&D output, as represented by patents.
5.2 Description of the Procedure and the Data
Our calibration procedure consists of the following four steps:
1. GMM estimation of the values of the unobservable parameters , 0
and 1 based on U.S. 1963-1980 data: results in Table 2.
2. Use of the estimated parameter values ^, ^0 and ^1, along with other
parameters shown in Table 1 in the system of equations of the balanced
growth path equilibrium of the Privatized Basic Research Economy.
3. Use of the previous parameters and of the steady state equilibrium
amount of basic research labour, m(A0)nB, estimated in Step 2 into
the Public Basic Research Economy scenario, setting LG = m(A0)nB,
and simulation of the corresponding Public Basic Research Economy
model.
4. Comparison of the steady state innovation rates and welfare levels of
the two policy scenarios of steps 2 and 3.
L is the percentage of people who were 25 year old or more and who had
completed at least 4 years of college, collected by the U.S. Census (2010a),
Current Population Survey, Historical Tables24.
24Available at: www.census.gov/population/socdemo/education/tabA-2.xls
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We set the intra-sectorial congestion parameter a = 0:3, consistently with
Jones and Williams(1998) and (2000) calibrations.
LG is calculated by dividing the expenditure on basic research by the
amount of wages paid to publicly employed scientist and engineers25. The
relevant series of the expenditure on basic research in our estimations is the
total basic R&D expenditure net of the industry performed basic R&D26.
ws is the skilled premium estimated by Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull and
Violante (2000).
The gPUBBL data (according to our model, the measure of the actual U.S.
innovation rate before 1980) are the number of utility patents granted to U.S.
residents per million inhabitants27.
We set the mark-up  to 1:60, consistently with what estimated by Roeger
(1995) and Martins et al. (1996).
As for the real rate of return on consumer assets, we adopt the usual
r = 0:05, consistently with Mehra and Prescotts (1985) estimates for the
pre-1980 period.
The following Table 1 reports the parameters we have utilised and their
sources:
25Source: US Census - Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic supple-
ments.
26Both series are taken from the NSF Science & Engeneering Indicators (2005).
27Source: USPTO (2010).
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Table 1
Parameter Description Value Source
 Mark-up 1:60 Roeger (1995)
and Martins et
al. (1996)
a R&D conges-
tions
0:3 Mehra and
Prescott
(1985)
L Skilled Labour
(intensity
1979)
0:164 U.S. Cen-
sus, Current
Population
Survey
M Unkilled
Labour (inten-
sity 1979)
0:836 U.S. Cen-
sus, Current
Population
Survey
 Subjective
Rate of Time
Preference
0:05 Jones and
Williams
(1998) and
(2000)
 Skilled Share
in Manufactur-
ing
0:098 GMM Estima-
tion
0 Basic Research
Productivity
0:25279 GMM Estima-
tion
1 Applied
Research
Productivity
0:38116 GMM Estima-
tion
We have estimated the R&D and manufacturing technological parameters
0 , 1 , and  in the Public Basic Research scenario, by using the Generalised
Method of Moments28 (GMM) with data from 1963 to 198129. The reason
28The software we have used is E-views 6.
29We can safely use the 1981 data to measure the e¤ects of the "pre-1980" regime,
because basic research innovation takes many years and its e¤ects accrue over time. Drop-
ping 1981 and even 1980 would not change qualitative results anyway, though reducing
the e¢ ciency of the estimates.
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why we have also estimated parameter  - the high skilled labour30 share in
manufacturing production - instead of relying on available statistics, is that
they fail to single out the fraction of high skilled labour in production31, con-
sistently with our stylized economy. Since we do not have data on variables
m(A0), nA, v0L, v
1
L, x, we have reduced system (8a)-(8g) by repeated substi-
tutions to only two equations32, and used these to estimate the parameters
with the remaining variables, ws, M , L, LG, gPUBBL, on which we have time
series from 1963 to 1981. The GMM estimator can deal with such highly
non-linear equations, is consistent, and, more importantly, yields results ro-
bust to heteroschedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form (Hansen,
1982). In the estimates reported in Table 2 we had chosen the weighting ma-
trix in GMM-Time Series (HAC), with Newey and West xed bandwidth33
Quite reassuringly, our results do not di¤er substantially34 when we use the
Two-Stage Instrumental Variable (IV) estimator, which may be desirable in
small samples in case heteroschedasticity is not present. Similarly for the
Three-Stage IV estimators35. In all our GMM and IV regressions we have
used lagged innovation as an instrument.
In order to check the robustness of our simulations of the alternative
scenarios, we have let our estimates vary on their 95% condence interval. In
Table 2 we report the GMM estimated condence intervals for the estimated
parameters:
30In this papers restrictive interpretation as highly skilled workers with at least college
education, and able to perform R&D activities competently.
31For example, the ratio of non-production workers in operating establishments to total
employment in 1979 was 0.248 (Berman, Bound, and Griliches, 1994), but this would
include a large fraction of not highly skilled workers, as well as people actually undertaking
knowledge-related activities.
32Reported in Appendix 3.
33But results only marginally changed when we used (as a robustness check) Andrews
and Variable Newey-West bandwidth selection. These are not reported in the paper to
save space, but would not change the rankings of the simulated scenarios.
34They are almost identical even with simple Nonlinear Least Squares. Of course, the
GMM estimator is more e¢ cient in the presence of arbitrary heteroschedasticity.
35With resulting estimates: ^0 = 0:257987, ^1 = 0:387889, and ^ = 0:097176; and
p-values lower than 2%.
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Table 2
Method: GMM Coe¢ cient t0:025(18  3)  se
 0:09822279 2:131  0:00549361
0 0:252794927 2:131  0:007829546
1 0:381161461 2:131  0:0897984364
where t0:975(18 3)denotes the 97.5% value of the Student-t random vari-
able with T   k = 15 degrees of freedom, and se denotes the standard errors
of the estimate. All variables are highly signicant, and their 5% condence
interval are relatively small. We will use them, along with the other parame-
ters taken from the literature, to compare the alternative policy scenarios.
5.3 Policy Comparisons
In this section we utilise the previously estimated values of the technolog-
ical parameters as well as all the previously estimated exogenous to compute
the hypothetical steady state equilibrium of the two scenarios - unpatentable
research tools versus patentable research tools - for the year 1979, i.e. the last
year of the non-patentable research tools regime. It is important to remark
that the qualitative results do not change if instead we use any combinations
of the data in the last 5 years time interval (from 1975 to 1979).
In our exercise, we compared the steady state equilibrium innovative per-
formance of the patentable research tool scenario not only with the actual
performance in those years, but also with a hypothetical public scenario
constrained to employ the same number of basic researchers as would the
privatize system have done. This allowed us to purge the comparison from
di¤erent levels of employment and allows us to focus on the induced e¢ -
ciency gains from research tool patentability. In fact, the endogenous public
sector ine¢ ciency in channelling researchers e¤ort only in the sectors where
rms need a research tool is weighted against the under-incentive e¤ect of
the patented research tools in the downstream research.
The following Table 3 lists the comparative innovation rates in the pri-
vatized scenario and in the public basic research scenario, at the estimated
coe¢ cient values as well as at the lower and higher bounds of their 95% con-
dence intervals We have xed  at its point estimate value, just to economize
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on space, but results would not change much (certainly not the qualitative
ranking) if we had let  take on other values in its 95% condence inter-
val. However, given their importance, we report the results associated with
the technological parameters 0 and 1. The upper part of Table 3 shows
how the balanced growth path aggregate innovation rate of the public basic
research economy, gPUBBL, changes over the 95% condence interval of the
parameters 0 and 1; while the lower part of Table 3 shows how the bal-
anced growth path aggregate innovation rate of the privatized basic research
economy, gPRIV , changes over the 95% condence interval of the parameters
0 and 1.
Table 3
gPUBBL Lowest 1 Estimated 1 Highest 1
Lowest 0 0.0193 0.0307 0.0371
Estimated 0 0.0196 0.0314 0.0381
Highest 0 0.0204 0.0320 0.0390
gPRIV Lowest 1 Estimated 1 Highest 1
Lowest 0 0.0203 0.0314 0.0373
Estimated 0 0.0207 0.0321 0.0383
Highest 0 0.0215 0.0329 0.0393
As the data in the table show, the privatized basic research scenario
outgrows the public basic R&D regime for all combinations of the underlying
technological parameters along their 95% condence interval. The simulated
privatized economy outgrew the unpatentable R&D scenario in the relevant
period immediately before the US turning point, and hence we can say that
the 1980 US normative change was the rational institutional response to
underlying technological modications, as if politicians literally simulated
the e¤ects of the reformation within their minds before deciding to change
the laws.
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We have also simulated the welfare levels36
Welfs =
Z 1
0
e rt

log()gst+ log(x

sM
1 )

dt =
=
log()gs
r2
+
log(xsM
1 )
r
, s = PUBBL, and PRIV . (16)
associated with the di¤erent IPR scenarios. Notice that both the steady state
innovation rate, gs, and the steady state skilled manufacturing employment,
xs, can di¤er in di¤erent institutional scenarios s. More labour in research
would imply less manufacturing, with a negative level e¤ect on welfare, pos-
sibly compensated by a positive growth e¤ect. Since the unskilled workers
are only employed in manufacturing, its level, M , does not change with s.
The simulated welfare values are shown in Table 4. The upper part of
Table 4 shows how the balanced growth path welfare of the public basic
research economy, WelfPUBBL, changes over the 95% condence interval
of the parameters 0 and 1; while the lower part of Table 4 shows how
the balanced growth path welfare of the privatized basic research economy,
WelfPRIV , changes over the 95% condence interval of the parameters 0
and 1.
Table 4
WelfPUBBL Lowest 1 Estimated 1 Highest 1
Lowest 0 -5.7138 -4.4561 -3.7273
Estimated 0 -5.6039 -4.2161 -3.3904
Highest 0 -5.5003 -3.9873 -3.0656
WelfPRIV Lowest 1 Estimated 1 Highest 1
Lowest 0 -4.8690 -3.2804 -2.3743
Estimated 0 -4.7366 -3.0160 -2.0207
Highest 0 -4.6111 -2.7615 -1.6769
The privatized basic research regime seems to dominate the public regime
also in terms of welfare. Therefore the reader can notice from our tables
that in 1979 the unpatentability of the basic scientic ndings imposed more
ine¢ ciency to the US innovation system than would the monopolization of
36See Appendix 1 for the derivation of this expression.
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applied research would have implied. The policy makers or the courts ended
up acting as if they had been aware of this, thereby switching law and doctrine
towards the patentability of research tools, inaugurated at the beginning of
the Eighties. Therefore our analysis suggests that the policy change in favour
of the research tools patentability occurred in the United States from the
early Eighties was very likely to be the best institutional reaction to the
increase in R&D complexity.
6 The Research Exemption Economy
A patent gives the inventor the exclusive rights to manufacture, use or
sell the invention. But it is more important to stress that all these rights are
veto-rights: hence they can be exercised only if the patent holder is able to
observe and sue the infringer of his/her patent. Unlike the production of new
nal products, which can be easily observed by someone who has a patent on
it, the use of a specic research tool in the R&D of a new product can hardly
be observed by third parties: its only output is the probability per unit time of
innovating. More realistically, only after the innovation has actually appeared
- i.e. the corresponding nal product gets patented and actually produced -
will the research tool patent holder be able to e¤ectively exercise his power
to sue, forcing the infringer who succeeded in innovating to share the prots
resulting from the sale of the nal product. This kind of strategic R&D
environment is known as "Research Exemption", and it is subject to intense
juridical controversies37, following the famous Supreme Court decision on
Madey v. Duke University suit, which practically eliminated the possibility
of appealing to it, except under very narrow circumstances. In cases where
access to research tools through the marketplace is highly problematic, a
research exemption is deemed desirable (Mueller, 2004).
Therefore, the privatized scenario of Section 4 corresponds to a an ex-
treme case of perfect information and veriability of the unauthorized use of
the patented research tool. Here, in order to assess the robustness of our pre-
vious numerical results, we simulate would happen in another privatized case,
but with imperfectly informed patent holders. With this aim, in this section
we develop a third scenario that emphasizes the e¤ect of ex-post bargaining
between an upstream patent holder and its downstream developer: an in-
37See Mueller (2004) for a detailed discussion of the research exemption debate in the
US.
25
novation (a completed half idea) can be patented and yet infringe another
patent (the patented research tool).
The new model of this section is inspired by Green and Scotchmer (1995),
which pioneered microeconomic research on this important issue38. In order
to cast their insight in our general equilibrium framework, we assume that the
new nal product is patentable but infringes its research tool. Ex post bar-
gaining is rationally expected to transfer to the basic research patent holder
a fraction 0 <  < 1 of the value of the nal product patent, representing its
relative bargaining power. Unlike Green and Scotchmers (1995) assumption
of a unique downstream researcher, we here assume that the downstream
unauthorized research with a patented research tools can be carried out by a
multitude of freely entrant R&D rms, thereby implying a demand e¤ect on
R&D inputs dissipating expected prots, and potentially depressing welfare.
Our analysis is also valid in the case of reach-through licensing agreements,
which seem pervasive in the US. "For research tools ... [r]oyalities would be
pass-through royalties from the product developed to the tool." Maurer and
Scotchmer (2004b, p. 236). We rst analyze non-exclusive licenses, while
the next subsection will study exclusive pass-through licensing agreements.
In all our cases, we assume that the ultimate patent on the nal product
improvement can be granted to only one rm: the rst to invent it.
Let vB,v0L, and v
1
L denote respectively the present expected value of a
basic blocking patent (vB), an A0 industry quality leader (v0L ), and an A1
industry challenged leader (v1L).
Costless arbitrage between risk free activities and rmsequities imply
that at each instant the following equations shall hold in equilibrium:
ws = 0n
 a
B vB (17a)
rvB = 1n
1 a
A
 
v0L   vB

+
dvB
dt
(17b)
ws = 1n
 a
A (1  ) v0L (17c)
rv0L =    n1 aB 0
 
v0L   v1L

+
dv0L
dt
(17d)
rv1L =    n1 aA 1v1L +
dv1L
dt
(17e)
Equation (17a) is the zero prot condition of a free entrant basic R&D
38See Scotchmer (2004, section 5.2) for an accessible exposition of this complex issue.
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rm in an A0 industry, equalizing the skilled wage and the probability 0n aO
of inventing a half idea times the value vB of the resulting blocking patent.
Equation (17b) states that nancial arbitrage pins down the unique value
of the blocking patent that equals the risk free income from its sale, rvB,
to the expected present value of maintaining it in an A1 industry. These
are the expected increase in value deriving from someone elses - the nA
downstream researchers - discovering the industrial application, plus the
gradual appreciation in the case of someone elses R&D success not arriving,
dvB
dt
.
Equation (17c) is the free entry condition for downstream completers that
rationally expect to appropriate only fraction 1   of the value of the nal
good monopolist. Notice that unlike in Section 5, the expectation of ex-post
bargaining or the presence of reach-through licenses introduces a negative
incentive e¤ect of downstream innovation, because the infringers use of a
research tool can appropriate only a fraction of the value of its marginal
product.
The last two equations have the usual interpretation.
It is important to note that our results do not hinge on assuming that
the rst stage patent holder undertakes no applied R&D. In fact, the free
entry condition (17c) dissipates all excess prots from doing so: the research
tool patent holder, by hiring a marginal unit of skilled labour to complete its
patent would increase its expected gains by 1n aA (1  ) v0L ws = 0. Hence,
it would just be equivalent to one of the free entrants into downstream R&D.
Therefore, our model is consistent with an indeterminate R&D participation
of the rst stage blocking patent holder.
It is also important to notice that free entry into downstream research
vanies any attempt to resort to ex ante licensing, which would instead hold
if, as Green Scotchmer (1995), Scotchmer (1996), Denicolo (2000), and Aoki
and Nagaoka (2007), we had restricted entry to the second stage of R&D to
only one completing rm.
As in the previous sections, the industrial dynamics of this economy is
described by the following rst order ordinary di¤erential equation:
dm(A0)
dt
= (1 m(A0))1 (nA)1 a  m(A0) (nB)1 a 0. (18)
These equations, supplemented with the skilled labour market equilibrium
condition
x+m(A0)nB + (1 m(A0))nA = L (19)
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and by eq. (11) for x determine the equilibrium trajectories.
Since is either regime there is free entry into one of the two types of
research activities, this may lead to excessive entry into basic research in the
private regime, and excessive entry into development in the public regime,
and potentially too in this sections private regime, due to the absence of a
market for basic ideas. While the lack of commercial focus in basic research
can make publicly funded research worse, excessive entry into basic research
in the private regime can potentially counter this handicap. Hence, it is not
possible a priori to rank the two regimes. This makes a numerical analysis
based on estimated parameters compelling.
We utilise the previously estimated values of the technological parame-
ters as well as all the previously described relevant exogenous parameters
to compute the hypothetical steady state equilibrium of the two scenarios
- unpatentable research tools versus patentable research tools - for the year
1979, the last year of the non-patentable research tools regime. It is im-
portant to remark that our comparisons would not change if instead we
use any combinations of the data in the last 5 years time interval (from
1975 to 1979). The aggregate innovation rate in this economy is denoted
gREx  (1 m(A0))1 (nA)1 a. This expression will be used in all simula-
tions.
6.1 Balanced Growth Path
Also in this economy, in a balanced growth path equilibrium all variables
are constant except the average quality of consumer goods, and therefore
the instantaneous percapita utility index, which grows at a constant rate
ln()gREx proportional to the aggregate innovation rate gREx = m(A0) (nB)
1 a 0 =
(1 m(A0))1 (nA)1 a. Based on the previous characterization, we can
state:
Denition 3. A balanced growth path equilibrium of the Research Ex-
emption economy is a vector [m(A0); nB; nA; vB; v0L v
1
L; ws; x; gREx] 2 R9+ sat-
isfying m(A0) 2 [0; 1] and the following equations:
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ws = 0n
 a
B vB (20a)
rvB = 1n
1 a
A
 
v0L   vB

(20b)
ws = 1n
 a
A (1  ) v0L (20c)
rv0L =    n1 aB 0
 
v0L   v1L

(20d)
rv1L =    n1 aA 1v1L (20e)
(1 m(A0))1 (nA)1 a = m(A0) (nB)1 a 0 (20f)
L = x+m(A0)nB + (1 m(A0))nA (20g)
x =
1
ws


1  

M (20h)
gREx = (1 m(A0))1 (nA)1 a . (20i)
Due to the analytical complexity of such system, also in this case we
resorted to numerical analysis. In all numerical simulations we have run,
the steady state exists, and it is saddle point stable for any set of parameter
values. Therefore, given an initial condition for m(A0), there is (locally) only
one initial condition for v0L, v
1
L, and vA such that the generated trajectory
tends to the steady state vector: the equilibrium is determinate.
Since, in principle, our numerical simulations could converge to just one
of possibly many di¤erent steady states, the empirical calibrations and policy
conclusions we could obtain would not be credible unless we can rst prove
analytically the uniqueness of the steady state in the model we are using.
This is achieved by the following:
Lemma 3. In the Research Exemption economy there can exist no more
than one balanced growth path equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
6.2 Numerical Comparisons
In this section, we compare the steady state equilibrium innovative per-
formance of the patentable research tool scenario with a hypothetical public
scenario constrained to employ the same number of basic researchers as in
the private equilibrium. As in Scotchmer and Green (1995) and Scotchmer
(1996), we set parameter  = 0:5.
As in the previous comparison, we have followed the following four steps.
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1. GMM estimation of the values of the unobservable parameters , 0
and 1 based on U.S. 1963-1980 data: results in Table 2.
2. Use of the estimated parameter values ^, ^0 and ^1, along with other
parameters shown in Table 1 in the system of equations of the balanced
growth path equilibrium of the Research Exemption Economy.
3. Use of the previous parameters and of the steady state equilibrium
amount of basic research labour, m(A0)nB, estimated in Step 2 into
the Public Basic Research Economy scenario, setting LG = m(A0)nB,
and simulation of the corresponding Public Basic Research Economy
scenario.
4. Comparison of the steady state innovation rates and welfare levels of
the two policy scenarios of steps 2 and 3.
The following Table 5, lists the comparative innovation rates in the pri-
vatized scenario and in the public basic research scenario, at the estimated
coe¢ cient values as well as at the lower and higher extremes of their 95%
condence intervals. We report the results associated with the technological
parameters 0 and 1, which the reader can nd in Table 2. The upper part
of Table 5 shows how the balanced growth path aggregate innovation rate
of the public basic research economy, gPUBBL, changes over the 95% con-
dence interval of the parameters 0 and 1; while the lower part of Table
5 shows how the balanced growth path aggregate innovation rate of the re-
search exemption economy, gREx, changes over the 95% condence interval
of the parameters 0 and 1.
Table 5
gPUBBL Lowest 1 Estimated 1 Highest 1
Lowest 0 0.0190 0.0275 0.0304
Estimated 0 0.0198 0.0292 0.0346
Highest 0 0.0206 0.0307 0.0326
gREx Lowest 1 Estimated 1 Highest 1
Lowest 0 0.0198 0.0282 0.0307
Estimated 0 0.0208 0.0300 0.0352
Highest 0 0.0216 0.0318 0.0330
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As the data in the table show, the privatized basic research scenario with
the possibility of downstream researchers carrying out R&D and infringing
the upstream patent holder outgrows the public basic R&D scenario for all
combinations of the underlying technological parameters over their 95% con-
dence interval.
Also in this case we have also simulated the welfare levels
Welfs =
Z 1
0
e rt

log()gst+ log(x

sM
1 )

dt =
=
log()gs
r2
+
log(xsM
1 )
r
, s = PUBBL, and REx. (21)
associated with the di¤erent IPR scenarios. Notice again that both the steady
state innovation rate, gs, and the steady state skilled manufacturing employ-
ment, xs, can di¤er in di¤erent institutional scenarios s.
The simulated welfare values are shown in Table 6. The upper part of
Table 6 shows how the balanced growth path welfare of the public basic
research economy, WelfPUBBL, changes over the 95% condence interval of
the parameters 0 and 1; while the lower part of Table 6 shows how the
balanced growth path welfare of the research exemption economy,WelfREx,
changes over the 95% condence interval of the parameters 0 and 1.
Table 6
WelfPUBBL Lowest 1 Estimated 1 Highest 1
Lowest 0 -5.7076 -4.6454 -4.2454
Estimated 0 -5.5944 -4.3939 -3.9093
Highest 0 -5.4879 -4.1522 -3.5778
WelfREx Lowest 1 Estimated 1 Highest 1
Lowest 0 -4.8461 -3.7253 -3.3586
Estimated 0 -4.7024 -3.4328 -2.9923
Highest 0 -4.5680 -3.1485 -2.6288
The privatized basic research regime seems better in terms of welfare than
the public regime even if patentable research tools could not allow stopping
the unauthorized use of patented research tools. We can now conrm that
our analysis suggests that the policy change in favour of the research tools
patentability occurred in the United States from the early Eighties was very
likely to be the best institutional reaction to the increase in R&D di¢ culty.
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This research exemption and/or reach-through agreements analysis is
therefore quite important in assessing the robustness of our previous results,
in favour of the US policy shift towards the patentability of basic knowledge
in 1980.
7 Final Remarks
The debate on the e¤ects of the patentability of research tools on the in-
centives to innovate is still very controversial, not only in the US but also in
Europe and in other important areas of the world. This paper analyzed from
a general equilibrium perspective the US policy shift towards the extension
of patentability to research tools and basic scientic ideas that took place
around 1980. These normative innovations have been modifying the indus-
trial and academic lives in the last three decades, raising doubts on their
desirability. The losses from the free entry into basic research and the mo-
nopolization of applied research induced by intellectual property of research
tools have been compared with the ine¢ cacy of public research institutions
to promptly react to downstream market opportunities and the potentially
excessive entry into applied R&D.
Results were not a priory unambiguous, which forced us to use the avail-
able data and calibrate and simulate our model in order to check if the US
did it right in changing their institutions around 1980. We have robustly
found that assigning property rights to basic research ndings and creating
a market for research tools was the best thing the US could do at that time.
We have extended the basic model to incorporate research exemptions
and reach-through licensing, without modifying our main policy conclusions.
In light of the current international negotiations on the application of
TRIPs, our analysis might be helpful in providing insights from the experi-
ence of an important turning point in the US national system of innovation.
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Appendix 1
Model Details
This Appendix explains the details of the quality ladder model used in the
main taxt. It may be skipped by most readers familiar with this literature.
Time t  0 population P (t) is assumed growing at rate gPop  0 and its
initial level is normalized to 1. The representative household preferences are
represented by the following intertemporally additive utility functional39:
U =
Z 1
0
e rt lnD(t)dt, (22)
39We skip starting with an expectational operator in order to save notation. A more
general setting of the consumer problem would not change results, as in our framework,
due to perfectly diversiable risks, law of large numbers, and perfect nancial markets,
the consumers asset evolves deterministically in equilibrium.
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where r > 0 is the subjective rate of time preference, and D(t) is an infra-
household percapita consumption index reecting the households taste for
variety and for product quality. Per-family member instantaneous utility is
given by:
lnD(t) =
Z 1
0
ln
 X
j
jdjt (!)
!
d!, (23)
where djt (!) is the individual consumption of a good of quality j = 1; 2; :::
(that is, a product that underwent up to j quality jumps) and produced
in industry ! at time t. Parameter  > 1 measures the size of the qual-
ity upgrades. This formulation, the same as in Grossman and Helpman
(1991a and b) and Segerstrom (1998), assumes that each consumer prefers
higher quality products of di¤erent varieties. Since we are not incorporat-
ing horizontal innovation, the set of varieties is bounded and normalised to
the unit interval. As explained by Grossman and Helpman (1991b, p.88),
D(t) = exp
"R 1
0
ln
 X
j
jdjt (!)
!
d!
#
can be interpreted as a CRS pro-
duction function of a homogenous nal product, produced with a range of
di¤erent intermediate goods of di¤erent qualities. Hence, in this model the
growth rate of the consumption index D(t) has an immediate interpretation
as the growth rate of nal production percapita.
The representative consumer is endowed with L > 0 units of skilled labor
and M > 0 units of unskilled labor summing to 1. Since labour bears no
disutility it will be inelastically supplied for any level of non negative wages.
Since initial population is normalized to 1, L and M will also equal, in
equilibrium, the percapita supply of skilled, respectively, unskilled labour.
Unskilled labor can only be employed in the nal goods production. Skilled
labour is able to perform R&D activities.
In the rst step of the consumers dynamic maximization problem, she
selects the set Jt(!) of the existing quality levels with the lowest quality-
adjusted prices. Then, at each instant, the households allocate their income
to maximize the instantaneous utility (23) taking product prices as given in
the following static (instantaneous) constraint equation:
E(t) =
Z 1
0
X
j2Jt(!)
pjt(!)djt (!) d!. (24)
Here E(t) denotes percapita consumption expenditure and pjt(!) is the
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price of a product of quality j produced in industry ! at time t. Let us dene
jt (!)  max fj : j 2 Jt(!)g Using the instantaneous optimization results, we
can re-write (23) as
u (t) =
Z 1
0
ln

j

t (!)E(t)=pjt (!)t(!)

d! = (25)
= ln[E(t)] + ln()
Z 1
0
jt (!)d!  
Z 1
0
ln[pjt (!)t(!)]d! (26)
The solution to this maximization problem yields the static demand function:
djt(!) =

E(t)=pjt(!) for j = jt (!)
0 otherwise.
(27)
Only the good with the lowest quality-adjusted price is consumed, since
there is no demand for any other good. We also assume, as usual, that if
two products have the same quality-adjusted price, consumers will buy the
higher quality product - although they are formally indi¤erent between the
two products - because the quality leader can always slightly lower the price
of its product and drive the rivals out of the market. Therefore in equilibrium,
only the latest version of the good jt(!) is produced and consumed.
Therefore, given the independent and - in equilibrium and by the law of
large numbers - deterministic evolution of the quality jumps and prices, the
consumer will only choose the piecewise continuous expenditure trajectory,
E(), of each family member that maximizes:
U =
Z 1
0
e rt ln[E(t)]dt. (28)
Assume that all consumers possess equal shares of all rms at time t = 0.
Letting A(0) denote the present value of human capital plus the present value
of asset holdings at t = 0, each households intertemporal budget constraint
is: Z 1
0
e I(t)egPoptE(t)dt 5 A(0) (29)
where I(t) =
R t
0
i(s)ds represents the equilibrium cumulative real interest
rate up to time t .
Finally, the representative consumer chooses the time pattern of con-
sumption expenditure to maximize (28) subject to the intertemporal budget
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constraint (29). The optimal expenditure trajectory satises the Euler equa-
tion:
_E(t)=E(t) = i(t)  (r + gPop) (30)
where i(t) = I(t) is the instantaneous market interest rate at time t, and
the transversality condition.
Euler equation (30) implies that a constant (steady state) per-capita con-
sumption expenditure is optimal when the instantaneous market interest rate
equals the consumers subjective discount rate r plus the population growth
rate g. Since preferences are homothetic, in each industry aggregate demand
is proportional to the representative consumers one. E denotes the aggregate
consumption spending and d denotes the aggregate demand.
As for the production side, we assume constant returns to scale technolo-
gies in the (di¤erentiated) manufacturing sectors represented by the following
production functions:
y (!) = X (!)M1  (!) , for all ! 2 [0; 1], (31)
where  2 (0; 1), y (!) is the output ow per unit time, X (!) and M (!)
are, respectively, the skilled and unskilled labour input ows in industry
! 2 [0; 1]. Letting ws and wu denote the skilled and unskilled wage rates,
in each industry the quality leader seeks to minimize its total cost ow C =
wsX (!)+wuM (!) subject to constraint (31). For y (!) = 1, the solution to
this minimization problem yields the conditional unskilled (32) and skilled
(33) labour demands (i.e. the per-unit labour requirements):
M (!) =

1  


ws
wu

, (32)
X (!) =


1  
1 
wu
ws
1 
. (33)
Thus the (minimum) cost function is:
C(ws; wu; y) = c(ws; wu)y (34)
where c(ws; wu) is the per-unit cost function:
c(ws; wu) =
h 
1 

 (1 )
+
 

1 
 i
wsw
1 
u . (35)
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Since unskilled labour is uniquely employed in the nal good sectors and
all price variables (including wages) are assumed to instantaneously adjust to
their market clearing values, unskilled labour aggregate demand
R 1
0
M (!) d!
is equal to its aggregate supply, MP (t), at any date. Since industries are
symmetric and their number is normalized to 1, in equilibrium40 M (!) =
MP (t).
The choice of unskilled labour as numeraire imposes wu = 1, from equa-
tions (32) and (33) we get the rms skilled labour demand negatively de-
pending on skilled (/unskilled) wage (ratio):
X(!) =
1
ws


1  

MP (t) (36)
In percapita terms,
x(!)  X(!)
P (t)
=
1
ws


1  

M . (37)
In each industry, at each instant, rms compete in prices. Given demand
function (27), within each industry product innovation is non-drastic41, hence
the quality leader will x its (limit) price by charging a mark-up  over the
unit cost (remember that parameter  measures the size of product quality
jump):
p = c(ws; 1)) d = E
c(ws; 1)
. (38)
Hence each monopolist earns a ow of prot, in percapita terms, equal to
 =
   1

E = (   1)wsx

 = (   1) 1
1  M . (39)
40More generally, with mass N > 0 of nal good industries, in equilibrium M (!) =
MP (t)
N .
41We are following Aghion and Howitts (1992) and (1998) denition of drastic inno-
vation as generating a su¢ ciently large quality jump to allow the new monopolist to
maximize prots without risking the re-entry of the previous monopoly. Given the unit
elastic demand, here the unconstrained prot maximizing price would be innitely high:
that would induce the previous incumbent to re-enter.
39
From eq.s (39) follows:
   1

E = (   1) 1
1  M ) E =

1  M . (40)
Interestingly, eq. (40) implies that in equilibrium total expenditure is always
constant. Therefore, eq. (30) implies a constant real interest rate:
i(t) = r + gPop. (41)
Population Growth and Scale E¤ects
In the main text, we assume constant population. However, introducing
growing population would not alter neither our model nor its main empirical
results, if we stationarize the growing variables in percapita terms42. In
particular, we dene nB(!; t)  NB(!;t)P (t) and nA(!; t)  NA(!;t)P (t) - where P (t)
denotes total population at time t - as the skilled labor employment in each
basic and, respectively, applied R&D sector. Notice that the assumed utility
function in (28) is of Millian type, with households maximizing the utility of
consumption percapita.
Notice that as the economies analyzed in the three models of this paper
tend to their balanced growth path, the corresponding rm prots and stock
market values will tend to evolve at the population growth rate gPop. To
stationarize them we normalize rm values by dividing them by population.
Therefore, for example, v1L(!; t)  V
1
L(!;t)
P (t)
, and similarly for all other rm val-
ues. Based on this, the reader can easility re-obtain the equations involving
rm values in the main text, because the terms that explicitly contain the
growth rate of population cancel out, as for example in
iv1L =    (nA)1 a 1v1L + v1LgPop +
dv1L
dt
,
which, based on eq. (41), becomes
(r + gPop)v
1
L =    (nA)1 a 1v1L + v1LgPop +
dv1L
dt
42Thereby eliminating the strong scale e¤ect (Jones, 1995 and 2005; Dinopoulos and
Thompson, 1998; and Madsen, 2008) as in Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998), Peretto
(1998), Young (1998).
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and hence
rv1L =    (nA)1 a 1v1L +
dv1L
dt
,
as it appears in eq.s (4c), (10d), and (17e). For the same reason, gPop disap-
pears from the other nancial market arbitrage equations.
Steady State Welfare
We here derive the equation used in our simulations to assess the steady
state welfare associated with each scenario. In equilibrium the instantaneous
utility function (23), after reminding that djt (!)t (!) = x
M1 , becomes
lnD (t) =
Z 1
0
ln

j

t (!)djt (!)t (!)

d! = log()
Z 1
0
jt (!)d! + log(x
M1 ).
(42)
In equilibrium jt (!) = jt(!) in all industries. Focussing on balanced growth
paths, we can assume43 that the economy starts from the steady state value
of all variables (including m(A0)). Hence:
lnD (t) = log()gst+ log(x

sM
1 ) + log()
Z 1
0
j0(!)d!, (43)
with index s = PUBBL, PRIV , and RExem, depending on the institu-
tional scenario chosen. In fact,
R 1
0
jt (!)d! = gst+
R 1
0
j0(!)d!. To understand
this, it is important to remember that all processes are independent, all sec-
tors are symmetric within A0 and A1, and there is an innite number of them.
Dene (t)  R 1
0
jt (!)d!. Consider a positive and small
44 time increment
t, and the increment (t + t)   (t) = R 1
0
[jt+t(!)  jt(!)] d!. Notice
that, by the properties of Poisson processes, jt+t(!) jt(!) = 0 or 1, except
for events with probability of a zero of higher order than t, which we write
o(t). By the law of large numbers the average number of jumps is equal to
its expected value. Hence:
(t+t)  (t) =
Z
A1(t)

0   1  (nA)1 a 1t+ 1  (nA)1 a 1t d! + 0(t) =
= (1 m(A0)) (nA)1 a 1t+ o(t).
43Analysing the transition would be arbitrary, and not interesting in a long-run per-
spective.
44Notice that here the two-stage innovation process used in this paper precludes the use
of the usual proof of Grossman and Helpman (1991b, p. 97).
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Dividing both sides by t and taking the limit t ! 0 , and remember-
ing that limt!0 o(t)=t = 0, gives 
0(t) = (1 m(A0)) (nA)1 a 1  gs.
Along a steady state gs is constant, and hence (t) = gst+ (0) = gst +R 1
0
j0(!)d!. Assuming that the initial value of
R 1
0
j0(!)d! is the same un-
der each scenario s = PUBBL, PAT , and RExem, we can normalise it at
zero. Therefore, with no loss of generality, we can use the following simpler
expression:
Welfs =
Z 1
0
e rt

log()gst+ log(x

sM
1 )

dt = (44)
=
log()gs
r2
+
log(xsM
1 )
r
, s = PUBBL, PRIV , and REx.(45)
This is the expression we have used in all our numerical welfare compar-
isons.
As a by-product of our analysis, notice that taking the derivative of both
sides of eq. (43) with respect to time gives:
_D (t)
D (t)
= log()gs,
which claries the link between the aggregate innovation rate gs and the
percapita consumption45 index growth rate.
Appendix 2
Lemma 1. In the Public Basic Research economy there can exist no more
than one balanced growth path equilibrium.
Proof. In the steady state, dm(A0)
dt
= 0, and hence eq. (5) can be rewritten
as:
(1 m(A0))n1 aA 1 = m(A0)L1 aG 0. (46)
which denes m(A0) as an increasing function of nA:
m(A0) =
n1 aA 1
L1 aG 0 + n
1 a
A 1
. (47)
45Or of actual percapita consumption, in the production function interpretation of D(t).
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From 47) it is easily seen that (1 m(A0))nA is an increasing function
of nA.
Eq. (4b) implies that v0L is an increasing function of v
1
L; in turn, (4c) im-
plies that v1L is a decreasing function of nA. Therefore, also v
0
L is a decreasing
function of nA. But then, eq. (4a) implies that ws too will be a decreasing
function of nA.
Let us then rewrite the labour market equilibrium condition (7) as
(1 m(A0))nA = L  1
ws


1  

M   LG. (48)
In light of the preceding discussion, the left side of equation (48) is an in-
creasing function of nA, while the right side is a decreasing function of nA.
The steady state equilibrium value of nA will be associated with the unique
intersection between the curves dened by the two sides of this equation.
Since the real values of all the other endogenous variables at the steady state
are pinned down by nA, they will be uniquely determined. Therefore, if a
steady state equilibrium exists it will be unique. QED.
Lemma 2. In the Privatized Basic Research economy there can exist no
more than one balanced growth path equilibrium.
Proof. Use eq.(10a) to obtain ws, and plug into (9) to obtain the steady
state version of eq. (10b), which, solved for vA gives:
vA =
a
r
a1  a
0
1 a
(nB)
1 a 1(v0L   vA). (49)
Plugging (10a) and (49) into (10b) and solving for v1L gives:
v1L =

r +

r(1 a)
a0
1 a
(nB)
a(1 a) 1
,
which can be plugged into eq. (10c) to solve for v0L as:
v0L =

r + (nB)
1 a 0
2641 + (nB)1 a 0
r +

r(1 a)
a0
1 a
(nB)
a(1 a) 1
375 . (50)
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Plugging (50) into eq. (49) and solving for vA yields:
vA =

r+(nB)
1 a0
"
1 + (nB)
1 a0
r+

r(1 a)
a0
1 a
(nB)
a(1 a)1
#
1 +
ra1 a0
aa(1 a)1 a(nB)a(1 a)1
. (51)
As will soon be clear, it is important to study how vA
naB
changes with naB.
Based on eq. (49), we can write: d
dnB

vA
naB

=
=
d
dnB
264 
rnaB + nB0
0B@1 + n1 aB 0
r + n
a(1 a)
B 1

  1
a
r
0
(a  1)
1 a
1CA aa(1  a)1 ana(1 a)B 1
ra1 a0 + aa(1  a)1 ana(1 a)B 1
375 =
44
=  
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
2a2r320n
3a2 a 1
B (1  a)1 a + a2r40n3a
2 2
B (1  a)1 a+
a2r31n
2a2+a 2
B (1  a)2 2a + a2r230na(3a 2)B (1  a)1 a+
r2201n
2a2 1
B (1  a)1 a

  1
a
r
0
(a  1)
1 a
+
a0
3
1n
2a 1
B (1  a)2 2a

  1
a
r
0
(a  1)
2 2a
+
2a2r221n
a2+2a 2
B (1  a)2 2a

  1
a
r
0
(a  1)
1 a
+
a2r31n
3a 2
B (1  a)2 2a

  1
a
r
0
(a  1)
2 2a
+
a2r201n
a(2a 1)
B (1  a)2 2a + (2  a) a22021na
2
B (1  a)2 2a

  1
a
r
0
(a  1)
1 a
+
2a2r201n
2a2 1
B (1  a)2 2a + 2a2r301n2a
2+a 2
B (1  a)1 a

  1
a
r
0
(a  1)
1 a
+
a2r20
2
1n
a2+a 1
B (1  a)1 a

  1
a
r
0
(a  1)
2 2a
+
2a2r2201n
2a2 1
B (1  a)1 a

  1
a
r
0
(a  1)
1 a
+
a2r20
2
1n
a2+2a 2
B (1  a)1 a

  1
a
r
0
(a  1)
2 2a
+
ar301n
a(2a 1)
B (1  a)1 a

  1
a
r
0
(a  1)
1 a
+
ar0
2
1n
a2+a 1
B (1  a)2 2a

  1
a
r
0
(a  1)
1 a
+
(1  a)r2021na
2+a 1
B (1  a)1 a

  1
a
r
0
(a  1)
2 2a
(3  a) a2r021na
2+a 1
B (1  a)2 2a

  1
a
r
0
(a  1)
1 a
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA

aa1 n
 4a2+2a+1
B
(0nB + rnaB)
2

ra1 a0 + aa
1
n
a(a 1)
B
(1  a)1 a
2
r + 1
n
a(a 1)
B

  1
a
r
0
(a  1)
1 a2
which is certainly negative because 0 < a < 1, that is:
d
dnB
 
n aB vA

< 0. (52)
Plugging (9) into (14), setting dm(A0)
dt
= 0, and solving for m(A0) gives:
m(A0) =
1
1 +
2+a0
1

a
r(1 a)
1 a
n
(1 a)2
B
. (53)
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Eq. (53) shows that m(A0) is a decreasing function of nB, and therefore
1 m(A0) is an increasing function of nB. However, notice also thatm(A0)nB
is and increasing function of nB.
Obtaining skilled wage from (10a) and plugging it into (11), and in light
of eq.s (9) and (49), we can rewrite the skilled labour market condition (13)
as:
m(A0)nB = L  M
(1  )0n aB vA
  (1 m(A0))n
a
B(1  a)r
0a
. (54)
Recalling the discussion after eq. (53), the left side of equation (54) is an
increasing function of nB. From (52) and (53), the right side of (54) is
instead a decreasing function of nB. Therefore there will exist only one
intersection between the corresponding curves, and therefore a unique real
value of nB that solves equation (54). Since the real values of all other
endogenous variables are uniquely pinned down by nB, there can exist only
a unique steady state equilibrium. QED
Lemma 3. In the Research Exemption Economy there can exist no more
than one balanced growth path equilibrium.
Proof. From system (20a) and (20h) we easily have:
r = 1n
1 a
A


v0L
vB
  1

(55a)
v0L
vB
=

nA
nB
a
0
1 (1  ) (55b)
nA
nB
1 a
=
m(A0)0
(1 m(A0))1 (55c)
The rst equation is obtained by dividing both sides of eq. (20b) by vB.
The second is the result of dividing eq.s (20a) and (20c) side by side. The
third comes directly from eq. (20f). If there exist more than one steady state,
then in one of them the mass m(A0) will be larger than in the other steady
state. But then, eq. (55c) implies that also nA
nB
will be higher than in the
other steady state, and hence - by eq. (55b) - v
0
L
vB
too. Hence by eq. (55a) nA
will be lower, which implies that v1L will be higher due to eq. (20e). Since
nA
nB
is higher, it follows that also nB is lower. Therefore, by eq. (20d) value
v0L will increase.
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Notice that eq. (55c) can be rewritten as
nA
nB
 a
1
0
=
nBm(A0)
nA (1 m(A0)) ,
which implis that the larger m(A0) is associated with a lower
nAm(A0)
nB(1 m(A0)) .
Since, as we know already, nB and (1 m(A0)) are lower, it must follows
that nAm(A0) has decreased as well. These and eq. (20g) require x to be
larger, and hence, by eq. (20g) that ws is lower. This and the previously
obtained lower value of nA are consistent with eq. (20c) if and only if v0L is
lower, which contradicts what previously obtained. In a similar way we can
exclude a BGP with a lower level of m(A0). QED
Appendix 3
The equations of the system used in our GMM estimation of 0, 1. and
, obtained from system (8a)-(8g), are the following:

1
a
1
= "
gPUBBL
(L  M
ws(1 )   LG)
# 1 a
a
2664
(   1) M
1  
r
0@ws[L  Mws(1 ) LG]
gPUBBL
  (   1) M
1    r
ws[L  Mws(1 ) LG]
gPUBBL
L1 aG 0
1A
3775 ;
and
266641  gPUBBL
ws[L  Mws(1 ) LG]
gPUBBL
  ws(
L M
ws(1 ) ) LG
gPUBBL
 
( 1) M1  
rws
gPUBBL
(L M)
ws(1 )LG
gPUBBL
L1 aG 0
(   1) M
1    rws
(L M)
ws(1 )LG
gPUBBL
37775
24(   1) M
1     r
ws
h
L  M
ws(1 )   LG
i
gPUBBL
(   1) M
1    r
ws[L  Mws(1 ) LG]
gPUBBL
L1 aG 0
35
= gPUBBL
24ws
h
L  M
ws(1 )   LG
i
gPUBBL
  (   1)
M
1    r
ws[L  Mws(1 ) LG]
gPUBBL
L1 aG 0
35 .
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As explained in the text., the time series for ws, M , L, LG, gPUBBLhave
been used in the estimations, while the parameters r, , and respectively a
have been set equal to 0:05, 1:60, and respectively 0:3.
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